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ABSTRACT 
The development of a well adapted financial system was a main part of the 
successful Swedish economic modernization in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. In this paper it is shown that this development followed the pattern of a 
financial revolution. Major institutional and organizational changes that took place 
roughly between the late 1850s and early 1870s led to a rapid increase in liquidity 
and financial services. This financial revolution preceded the acceleration in 
economic growth in general and in the modern, industrial sector in particular. 
Especially the monetization encouraged growth, both in the industrial sector and 
in GDP as a whole. The basis of the financial system, measured as commercial 
bank assets and equity capital affected overall GDP growth. The results also 
clearly promoted the importance of the development of the financial sector and the 
monetization as an interlinked and complementary process. 
JEL: E44; N13; N23; O16 
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Introduction 
With this paper I aim to contribute to the ongoing debate on the relationship between finance 
and growth. To do so I study whether Sweden in the nineteenth century experienced what has 
been labeled a financial revolution. I define a financial revolution as: The establishment of the 
fundamental organizations and institutions required for a successful financial system within a 
relative short time span. The idea of the financial revolution implies three things: 1) that there 
was a strong case of synergies between different parts of the financial sector and institutional 
change in the total financial development, 2) that the quality of the financial services 
improved through changing roles for the financial organizations governing financial activities, 
and 3) that the establishment of this entire financial system was positive for economic growth 
and modernization.  
To test the occurrence of such a financial revolution we expect a number of institutional 
and organizational changes that governs financial activities to be followed by an increase in 
financial activities in different financial sectors. We also expect this increase in financial 
services to be followed by economic growth at large and specifically within newer industries. 
As seen below empirical research on the relationship between finance and growth 
generally ends up testing the connection between one or a few single proxies that represents 
financial sector development, and general growth in GDP. Thus it usually misses out on three 
important aspects of the financial revolution: 1) the simultaneous and interlinked development 
of the financial system as a whole, 2) the qualitative improvement of the financial system and 
3) the importance of the financial revolution for creative destruction by forcing structural 
change through economic modernization.  
The idea of a financial revolution has been distilled from the historical experiences of 
among others England, Japan, the Netherlands and the US. The US example is the extreme in 
this respect putting all financial foundations into existence within a few years, including a 
generous possibility for bank establishments.
1 
Rousseau and Sylla points to six basic characteristics, or parts of a successful financial 
system: 1) Public finance, including its debt management, is run prudently, 2) A stable 
currency, 3) Private commercial banks involved in international and/or domestic financial 
business, 4) Monetary authority (-ies) that can act to stabilize domestic finances and manage 
                                                 
1 D.C. North & B.R. Weingast “Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public 
choice in seventeenth century England” in L.J. Alston et al. (Ed.) Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. 
Cambridge University Press (1996); thereafter: North & Weingast “Constitutions and commitment:” and P.L. 
Rousseau & R. Sylla “Emerging financial markets and early US growth” Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 
42 pp 1-26 (2005); thereafter: Rousseau & Sylla “Emerging financial markets”   3
international financial relations, 5) a well functioning securities market, and 6) a rapidly 
increasing number of corporations.
2 
So far the financial revolution is more of a scheme of the basic parts that a successful 
financial revolution requires, than a fully consistent theory on how the financial revolution 
comes into place and how it promotes real economic growth. The idea with the financial 
revolution is that the vital parts of the financial systems are dependent on institutional factors 
as well as on each other.   
Both empirical and theoretical research supports the positive link between growth in the 
financial sector and the real economy. Ross Levine points out several functions provided by 
the financial sector that may facilitate economic growth, such as to lower information and 
transaction costs, better risk management, pooling of resources (by mobilizing savings), and 
increasing the possibility to specialize production. This view nurtures the idea that the 
financial system has to be studied as a whole.
3  
What historical empirics on financial development make clear is that the institutions that 
are governing the financial system are of utmost importance. Historically it is easy to miss out 
on the importance of institutions since the development in general went from highly 
regulated, not to say oppressed, markets to more liberal possibilities to conduct business. In 
short the basic element of the financial revolution is of institutional nature and manages to 
successfully combine that of freedom for private initiatives based on institutions and 
organizations governed by the state. 
Rousseau and Sylla show that in the case of the US liberal possibilities to establish 
financial organizations, for instance banks and equity markets, supported the emerging 
economy’s economic modernization, i.e. a structural transformation to an industrial 
economy.
4 There are also studies showing the other side of the coin, that limiting the freedom 
of the financial sector, or by a too strong and unjust competition from the State, led to less 
lending and investments in newer and thus more risky projects (for instance to finance new 
technologies).
5 
The definition of a riskier project is a project where the financier ex ante has a smaller 
possibility to estimate the pay off, which is the case for newer less well known technologies. 
                                                 
2 P.L. Rousseau & R. Sylla “Financial systems, economic growth and globalization” in M.D. Bordo, A.M. 
Taylor and J.G. Williamson (Eds.) Globalization in Historical Perspective. University of Chicago Press (2003); 
thereafter: Rousseau & Sylla “Financial systems, economic growth” 
3 R. Levine “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda” Journal of Economic Literature 
35 (1997), pp. 688-726; thereafter: Levine “Financial Development” 
4 P.L. Rousseau & R. Sylla “Emerging financial markets”   4
This is of importance since it is reasonable to expect that the economic take-off should take 
place within newer technologies, i.e. what can be considered as a modern sector. This is, as 
argued by Schumpeter, why an oppressed financial sector impedes economic transformation 
and thus structural changes and economic growth in the long run.
6 
But the supply of financial services is not the only part of the story. It is also a question of 
quality. Any agent can promise and deliver an unlimited amount of credit (for instance in the 
form of IOUs), but this does not mean that it will be trusted and thus possible to use for 
transactions or investments. If the agent over-issues credit it will decrease in value or even 
become completely worthless. The question is how to supply the amount of credit of a quality 
that will ensure investments in newer technologies, and thus economic growth.  
The relationship between the financial system and economic growth in Sweden has been 
studied before. In 1978 Lars G. Sandberg published the article “Banking and Economic 
Growth in Sweden before World War I”. In this paper he linked the success story of the 
Swedish economy to the relative sophistication of the Swedish banking system. This in turn 
he argued was a result of the comparably early law on general schooling, providing the main 
part of the Swedish population with the ability to read and write.
7 The study made by 
Sandberg was later extended by Fisher and Thurman who showed that Swedish monetization 
took place before the 1890s.
8 
Pontus Hansson and Lars Jonung more recently studied the relationship between the 
financial market and economic growth in Sweden. In the 1997 paper “Finance and economic 
growth: the case of Sweden 1834-1991” they tested the cointegration relationship between the 
volume of commercial bank lending, investments and real GDP in per capita terms. The 
conclusion for the whole period was that the development of the financial sector and 
economic growth was a case of mutual interaction. Although for the period 1890 until 1939 it 
seemed as finance may have had a leading impact on growth. Clearly they assumed that the 
role of the financial sector at large was to meet the quantitative demand for investments. Thus 
the driving force of the financial sector during one sub period was simply explained by 
                                                                                                                                                         
5 See for instance Temin, P. & Voth, H-J. (2005) 
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7 L.G. Sandberg “Banking and Economic Growth in Sweden before World War I.” Journal of Economic History 
38 (1978), pp. 650-80; thereafter Sandberg “Banking and Economic Growth” and L.G. Sandberg “The Case of 
the Impoverished Sophisticate: Human Capital and Swedish Economic Growth before World War I.” Journal of 
Economic History 39 (1979), pp. 225-41; thereafter: Sandberg “The Case of the Impoverished Sophisticate” 
8 D. Fisher & W.N. Thurman “Sweden’s Financial Sophistication in the Nineteenth Century: An Appraisal.” 
Journal of Economic History 49  (1989), pp. 621-34; thereafter: Fisher and Thurman “Sweden’s Financial 
Sophistication”   5
lending working as a proxy for investments.
9 However, this is an interpretation which is not 
compatible with empirical evidence of the sources of firms funding for the period.
10  
Peter L. Rousseau and Paul Wachtel also found in a study including the US, Canada, UK, 
Norway and Sweden that the Swedish financial sector in terms of total assets, the monetary 
base and GDP were cointegrated for the period 1870-1929.
11 However the Swedish data used 
are problematic: the series on Swedish GDP is old and have been thoroughly revised; their 
definition of the monetary base is misleading since it also includes private bank notes in 
circulation that were inside money and not potential reserves for the banking system.
12 
I have used a more complete database which is up to date for this study. Using this new 
data I find that Sweden roughly from the middle of the 1850s until the early 1870s 
experienced what can be considered as a financial revolution. An important part of this 
revolution was the liberalization of bank establishment. This resulted in a rapid boost in 
financial services, including the monetization, occurring in the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
The financial revolution represented by the commercial banking system and the monetization, 
preceded the increased growth in the real economy, including growth in the emerging 
industrial sector. The industrial sector overtook agriculture as the largest part of GDP by the 
end of the nineteenth century. And subsequently growth in the industrial sector preceded 
growth in GDP as a whole.  
As source for GDP I use the most recent series estimated by Olle Krantz. This series also 
has the benefit of being divided into different sectors, why it is possible to identify a series for 
growth in industry; or the modern sector as it is labeled in this paper. I have also collected 
data on more accurate series on all monetary variables. This revised data also makes a proper 
distinction in the case of Sweden between monetary base, private bank notes and liquidity 
(M0) possible. Liquidity is defined as Riksbank and private bank notes held by the public. 
The data on the commercial banks is for the years before 1870 gathered from Post & Inrikes 
tidning which was issued daily as the official bulletin of the State. After 1870 the balance 
sheets of the commercial banks were assembled in Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter.  
                                                 
9 P. Hansson & L. Jonung “Finance and economic growth: the case of Sweden 1834-1991” Research in 
Economics  51  (1997), pp. 275-301; thereafter Hansson & Jonung “Finance and economic growth” and P. 
Hansson & L. Jonung. Det finansiella systemet och den ekonomiska tillväxten: Svenska erfarenheter 1834-1991. 
SOU 2000:11. (Stockholm 2000); thereafter Hansson & Jonung. Det finansiella systemet.  
10 T. Gårdlund Svensk industrifinansiering under genombrottsskedet 1830-1913 (Stockholm 1947); thereafter: 
Gårdlund Svensk industrifinansiering 
11 P.L. Rousseau & P. Wachtel “Financial Intermediation and Economic Performance: Historical Evidence from 
Five Industrialized Countries” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30  (1998), pp. 657-678; thereafter: 
Rousseau & Wachtel “Financial Intermediation”   6
Economic growth and modernization in Sweden 
There are several dates for when Sweden is said to have experienced its industrial 
breakthrough. Lennart Jörberg in his study of the Swedish industrialization pointed to the 
1830s as the starting point of the industrialization, with an acceleration in its growth from the 
1870s. Generally the story of Swedish economic growth is attributed to have taken off in the 
1870s, but also the 1890s is viewed as an important decade for the Swedish industry and 
economic growth.
13 




















































































































Sources: Krantz, O. (2001), SCB (1955) 
Just looking at the per capita GDP index seem to support both the interpretations that 
Swedish economic growth went through a positive change in the 1870s as well as 1890s. 
Average yearly growth during the period 1834 until 1913 was 1.5 percent. Dividing the 
Swedish GDP growth in accordance with the schedule presented in previous research, shows 
that a shift in the GDP level occurred around 1870, but this without leading to a continuous 
higher annual growth rate. From the 1890s per capita GDP growth rate was more than two 
times higher than before.
14 
                                                                                                                                                         
12 A. Ögren “Free or Central Banking? Liquidity and Financial Deepening in Sweden, 1834 – 1913.” 
Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 43 (2006)  pp 64-93; thereafter: Ögren “Free or Central Banking” 
13 Hansson & Jonung “Finance and economic growth” and L. Jörberg Growth and Fluctuations of the Swedish 
Industry, 1869 – 1912: Studies in the process of industralisation (Stockholm 1961); thereafter: Jörberg Growth 
and Fluctuations and Sandberg “Banking and Economic Growth” and L. Schön En modern svensk ekonomisk 
historia. Tillväxt och omvandling under två sekel (Stockholm 2000); thereafter: Schön En modern svensk 
ekonomisk historia 
14 Ignoring the first years of non-growth shows that GDP grew at 1.2 percent per year between 1846 and 1869.    7
In figure 8 below, the choice to make the distinction between the two last periods the year 
1890 is based on previous research.
15 Whatever year that is chosen for when the shift in GDP 
took place or when the acceleration in began, this took place after the financial revolution had 
increased the financial services both in quantity and in quality.  
Figure 2: Growth patterns in Swedish Per Capita GDP (in volume index 1834 = 100). 
Logarithmic scale 
Annual Growth 1834 - 1869 = 1.0 %
Annual Growth 1870 - 1889 = 0.9 %




















































































Sources: Krantz, O. (2001), SCB (1955) 
A subsequent question is when the modern industrial sector came to be the dominant 
sector. As seen in figure 3 below both the agricultural and the industrial sector grew in 
absolute terms, but the modern sector grew in relative importance. Agriculture was surpassed 
by the modern sector as the main share of GDP in the middle of the 1890s.  
The industrial sector grew in cycles from the 1850s to the late 1870s. In the late 1880s 
industrial growth started to accelerate rapidly and also the private service sector grew. To 
some extent this may well have been due to the fact that services that previously had been 
conducted outside the formal market now became formally priced and paid.
16  
                                                 
15 Extending the middle period until 1894 increases growth in the middle period to a yearly average of 1 percent 
and decreases the average between 1895 and 1913 to 2.35 percent. 
16 There is a possibility that the so called service revolution of the economy is due to this phenomenon, see 
Schön En modern svensk ekonomisk historia   8
































































































Source: Krantz, O. (2001) 
For the entire period the rate of average annual growth in the modern sector was around 
2.5 percent. Growth in the modern sector was more volatile in the early period than is visible. 
The boom in the first half of the 1850s and the following slump during the crisis 1857 and 
1858 marked growth in the modern sector. So did the famine in the latter half of the 1860s as 
well as the boom in the early 1870s and the crisis in the late 1870s. It was during the latter 
part of the period that the highest growth was experienced. From 1880 growth in the industrial 
sector was almost four percent per year and from 1887 almost five percent, whereas it before 
1865 was somewhat lower than two percent a year, thus average annual growth ratio more 
than doubled. The distinct drop in the modern sector that happens in the years 1908 and 1909 
may be a result of the short but intensive crisis in 1907. Since financial crises and booms were 
visible in the growth of the sector (with a lag) this suggests a link between the modern sector 
and the financial sector.  
Did Sweden experience a financial revolution? 
It has been shown that the financial deepening in Sweden, measured as the increase in the 
broad money supply (M2) in relation to GDP, took paste in the late 1860s. This financial 
deepening was very quick during the first five years (1868 – 1872) when the financial 
deepening almost doubled. The deepening continued somewhat slower for another fifteen   9
years (1873 – 1887) when it again doubled and then started to decrease modestly for the 
following twenty five years until WWI.
17 This rapid financial deepening gives rise to the 
question whether Sweden experienced a financial revolution. 
Figure 4 below supports that the financial sector underwent a period of rapid growth that 
started in the late 1860s. The timing of this growth period seems to have been roughly 
between 1868 and 1876 with a more modest growth thereafter. There are four observations to 
be made from figure 4: 1) We can clearly distinguish two periods, the pre 1868 period when 
the financial system seems to have been more or less equivalent with liquidity and post 1868 
when pubic deposits broke through and which also witnessed a leap in commercial bank 
lending and assets. 2) Post 1868 there seems to be a virtual identity between commercial bank 
lending (LEND) and the money supply (M1) including the publics’ deposits in commercial 
banks (the same seems to be the case for commercial bank assets (ASSETS) and the broad 
money supply (M2) measures as liquidity plus public deposits in savings and commercial 
banks). 3) Commercial bank equity capital was long larger than commercial bank lending but 
this changes in 1868. 4) Also in line with the logic of the financial revolution the variables 
that provided the basis of the financial and monetary system, commercial banks’ equity 
capital, the monetary base and liquidity, all remained comparably stable under the period.  
                                                 
17 Ögren “Free or Central Banking” pp. 87-8   10
Figure 4: Growth in Commercial Bank Lending (LEND), Commercial Bank Equity Capital 
(EQCAP), Commercial Bank Assets (ASSETS), Monetary Base (MBASE), Liquidity (LIQ M0) 
and Broad Money Supply (M1 and M2) in Mill. SEK, 1834 – 1913. Per Capita and Constant 





























































































Sources: Myrdal, G & Bouvin, S. (1933), Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835 – 1870, Sammandrag af Bankernas 
Uppgifter 1870 – 1911, SCB (1955), Sveriges Riksbank ”Statistiska tabeller” [Statistical tables] in Sveriges 
Riksbank 1668-1924. Bankens tillkomst och verksamhet. Part V. (Stockholm 1931); thereafter: Sveriges 
Riksbank ”Statistiska tabeller” Ögren, A. (2003) 
From the middle of the 1850s to the early 1870s Sweden underwent a financial revolution. 
Although the period 1855 until 1870 might seem arbitrarily chosen if one is looking at 
changes in individual institutions or organizations, a macro perspective on all the changes that 
took place during this period supports this period as the period when the financial revolution 
was taking place. The Swedish financial revolution, as prior had been the case in other 
economies experiencing a financial revolution, consisted of a successful combination of new 
institutions governing the financial sector, the establishment of trustworthy monetary and 
financial authorities and increasing rights for the population to engage in financial businesses. 
Table 1 captures the importance of complementarities of monetary and financial authorities 
with liberal possibility for private initiatives.  
An illustrative example is how the National Bank, the Riksbank, decreased in relative 
importance from the 1840s. Still its assets, reserves and the monetary base all increased in 
absolute terms during the period. What these figures shows are how the role of the Riksbank 
was redefined during the period. The Riksbank became the monetary authority which notes   11
served as reserves in the banking sector, instead of being the main commercial bank in terms 
of assets and lending. This change in conjunction with the growth of private financial 
enterprises certainly underscores the financial revolution as a change both in institutional and 
quantitative financial terms. 
As part of the State’s role in the financial revolution is also the foreign debt which shows 
the increasing financial internationalization. Such a supply of international capital would not 
have been there without the proper institutions. This foreign debt was important for two 
reasons: 1) it provided the economy with capital for investments, and 2) due to the fact that 
proper institutions existed; the bonds that were issued as liabilities by the National Debt 
Office to raise this capital became good quality financial instruments (assets) assisting the 
development of the financial market. In fact most commercial banks would substitute such 
bonds for legal tender reserves.
18    
                                                 
18 Ögren A. “Lender of Last Resort in a Peripheral Economy with a Fixed Exchange Rate: Financial Crises and 
Monetary Policy in Sweden under the Silver and Gold Standards, 1834 – 1913” in P. Cottrell et al. (Eds.) 
Centers and Peripheries in Banking: The Historical Development of Financial Markets (Ashgate 2007); 
thereafter: Ögren: “Lender of Last Resort” and A. Ögren “The Rationale of Private Note Issuance: Note Issuing 
Commercial Banks in the Economic and Financial Development of Nineteenth Century Sweden” Unpublished 
Working Paper (EconomiX/Université de Paris X – Nanterre 2008); thereafter: Ögren “The Rationale of Private 
Note Issuance”    12
Table 1: Various financial measures in percent of GDP, 1840 – 1910 
Year  1840  1850  1860  1870 1880  1890  1900 1910 
Foreign  debt  -2.7%  -3.0%  12.2%  17.9%  20.5% 33.2% 24.3%  38.8% 
Riksbank assets  15.8%  12.3%  10.0%  7.6%  8.9%  9.8%  10.0%  11.0% 
Riksbank  lending  8.1%  6.0%  3.9%  2.0% 1.9%  2.9%  2.0% 1.2% 
Riksbank total reserve  6.7%  3.6%  2.9%  2.5%  2.2%  1.5%  2.0%  3.4% 
Monetary  Base  9.8%  6.7%  5.0%  3.0% 3.0%  3.2%  3.2% 6.5% 
Liquid Money Supply (M0 = 
circulating Riksbank and Enskilda 
bank notes) 
11.3%  8.7%  7.3%  5.3% 6.0%  6.4%  6.3% 6.5% 
Broad Money Supply (M2)  12.8%  11.5%  13.0%  19.0%  36.0%  49.9%  61.5%  78.3% 
Commercial bank assets  4.3%  6.6%  9.9%  19.6%  36.5%  45.2%  61.7%  79.4% 
Commercial bank lending  2.3%  3.0%  5.3%  10.8%  20.6%  30.7%  46.0%  64.8% 
Savings bank assets  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.1%  20.8%  21.5%  27.6% 
Savings bank lending  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  9.3%  16.7%  17.2%  22.9% 
Mortgage  associations  lending  0.4%*  1.4%*  2.2%*  9.9%  17.2% 19.9% 12.4%  9.2% 
Mortgage associations bond 
issuance  0.3%*  1.0%*  1.7%*  10.5%  20.5% 22.4% 13.2%  9.1% 
Life insurance companies’ net 
insurance fund  n.a. n.a. 0.1%  0.6% 2.4%  5.3%  7.1% 9.9% 
* Only the Skåne Hypoteksförening. 
Sources: Lindahl, E., Dahlgren, E. & Kock, K. (1937a), (1937b), Krantz, O. (2001), Nygren, I. (1967), (1981), 
Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835 – 1871, SCB (1960), Schön, L. (1999), Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871 
– 1911, Sommarin, E. (1934), Svenska livförsäkringsbolags förening (1958), Sveriges Allmänna Hypoteksbank 
(1911), Sveriges Riksbank (1931) 
Synergies in the financial system mean that financial variables should have grown in 
harmony after the financial revolution. As seen in table 1 this was largely true in the case of 
Sweden. Monetary variables not including deposits were relatively stable in relation to GDP 
during this period. When public deposits in commercial and savings banks are included, the 
money supply grew from thirteen percent of GDP in 1840 to seventy-eight in 1910. In 
absolute numbers, the growth was even more impressive, as GDP grew quite rapidly from the 
1870s and onwards.  
Whereas cross country studies supports the fact that financial depth to GDP is of 
importance for the economic performance of a country, a longitudinal study of the importance 
of financial growth for GDP will not benefit from increased financial depth. Nevertheless, the 
increased financial depth indicates a rapid financial development in the case of Sweden. As 
quantitative evidence supports that a financial revolution took place around 1870, also 
qualitative evidence points out that many fundamental institutional factors changed during the 
period just before; roughly between 1855 and 1870.  
Political representation 
The necessity of the political system in facilitating the establishment of an efficient financial 
system has been thoroughly analyzed as one of the main examples of the importance of   13
institutions for economic growth.
19 Needless to say, this assumes the idea of a well designed 
financial system as important for economic growth.  
The 1809 constitution was largely based on limiting the power of the Crown by increasing 
the power of the Parliament, and especially the Nobility. The political system was a form of a 
constitutional monarchy with the Crown acting as Government and the Parliament consisting 
of male representatives of the four Estates; the Bourgeoisie, the Clergy, the Nobility and the 
Peasantry. Of special importance in this constitutional design was the forcing of the 
Government (the Crown) to rely on the Parliament for funding as the latter had the exclusive 
right for taxation.  
From the 1840s it became obvious that belonging to an estate was not sufficient for 
agreeing in political matters. The groups in society that had the least influence within the 
Parliament, which also was the majority of the population, started to make its claims for 
increased representation. As a result a new constitution based on a two chamber Parliament 
was instigated in 1865. Comparably this change decreased the influence of the tax financed 
groups in society; the Clergy, the Nobility and of course the Government (the Crown). The 
1865 constitution instead increased the representation of property owing males subject to 
paying taxes.  
The Riksbank and the issuance of base money 
One of the keys of developing a financial sector is the establishment of a stable currency not 
only to open for foreign capital markets, but also to be used as an anchor, or as base money in 
the banking system. In 1834, after a decision in Parliament 1830, Sweden established a specie 
standard that was kept for eighty years until the outbreak of World War I.  
The importance of the stable currency for the financial sector is illustrated by the fact that 
this decision was the ignition for the first application to establish a commercial bank. No 
applications had been filed earlier although the Parliament and the Crown had launched 
special proclamation to promote private banks seven years prior.  
Later, as international markets increased in importance for the Swedish economy, the silver 
standard was changed into a gold standard in 1873. This change was a result of the German 
Reichsbank’s switch to a gold standard in 1871 and was made in connection to the 
                                                 
19 North & Weingast “Constitutions and commitment:”   14
establishment of the Scandinavian Currency Union when the unit of account was harmonized 
in the Scandinavian countries to the Krona.
20 
Despite the problematic track record of the Swedish currency the fixed exchange rate was 
kept, and it is probable that the faith in the stable currency grew in time. It became clearer 
over time that the priority of the Riksbank was to protect the fixed exchange rate above all 
other objectives.  
From the late 1850s the public debt increased and the absolutely largest part of this debt 
was held by foreigners, subsequently the loans were denominated in foreign currencies. The 
foreign debt thus put increased pressure on the importance of maintaining the fixed exchange 
rate as a depreciated currency would add to the problems of repaying this debt. As a 
consequence the Riksbank did not jeopardize the currency by engaging too heavily into lender 
of last resort activities. If further funds were needed for the banking system, the State 
represented by the Government and the Parliament stepped in and through the National Debt 
Office borrowed funds from abroad (i.e. England, France and Germany).
21 
In the 1870s a more formalized cooperation began between the Riksbank and the National 
Debt Office. This was done with the aim of better coordinating the effects the Office’s foreign 
borrowing had on the possibility of the Riksbank to maintain the specie standard. 
The Riksbank was not given note issuing monopoly in practice until 1903 when the right to 
issue notes for the Enskilda banks was abolished. Although the Swedish money stock from 
the 1830s partly consisted of private bank notes it was obvious throughout the period that the 
Riksbank was responsible for the currency. Notes issued by the Riksbank were the main 
component in the reserves of the banking system (whereas private bank notes never were kept 
as reserves).
22  
With the outspoken aim of ending the outdated bureaucracy of the Banks’ business the 
organization was fundamentally changed between the 1860s and early 1870s. The staff was 
downsized, the detailed regulations regarding the activities of the Bank was cut to a third 
increasing the freedom of the Board and the CEO of the Bank. The previously independent 
Loan Office became fully integrated into the Bank. Modernizing the loan business meant that 
funds that previously had been locked for specific purposes were freed. As a result old 
                                                 
20 K. Talia Monetary Integration and Disintegration: Studies in the Scandinavian Currency Union, 1873-1924. 
(Stockholm 2004); thereafter: Talia Monetary Integration. The Scandinavian Currency Union was established in 
1873. It consisted of Denmark, Norway (joined in 1875) and Sweden. Originally it only included coins valued at 
par, but from 1894 the SCU included notes as well.  
21 Ögren: “Lender of Last Resort”  
22 Ögren “Free or Central Banking”    15
fashioned subsidized agricultural loans and other outdated loans diminished considerably 
paving way for commercial lending collateralized for instance in bonds, stocks, bills of 
exchange, name and current account credit. Thus the Riksbank consolidated its own position 
at the same time as it circulated more of its notes to be used as reserves by the banking 
system. As a result of this consolidation the Riksbank in 1872 instigated a fund to be utilized 
in an outspoken sterilizing manner. 
The Riksbank clearly acted as a rudimentary form of central bank issuing base money. The 
commercial banks utilized the possibility to deposit funds in an interest bearing current 
account. Since deposits in the Riksbank could be made with Enskilda bank notes from 1869 if 
the Riksbank had the possibility to instantly exchange these notes for its own, it is likely that 
the Riksbank was engaged in clearing activities as well.
23 
The National Debt Office managing the public debt 
The importance of managing the public debt was twofold: 1) as was the case of the stable 
currency it served as a signal of trust to lenders, and 2) if the commitment of the State was 
trustworthy, the public debt in turn became financial assets/securities to be held by investors. 
For this to work it was essential to have a well structured tax system ensuring investors in the 
public debt that the State could extract the revenues needed for repayment.  
The role of the National Debt Office changed fundamentally when the Parliament of 
1853/54 decided to use the Office to raise the funds needed to build the core of the railroad 
system. The period 1854 to 1866 was a period of trail and error with incomplete 
organizational and institutional practices.  
At first the Office lacked experience the experience of managing international loans. Due 
to the internal organization of the Office it did not have continuous contact with the 
international economy and no contracted long term correspondents abroad. The commercial 
banking system was not competing about arranging the loans.
24 Because of the organization 
and history of the Swedish State’s financial authorities, the National Debt Office and the 
Riksbank acted as competitors. From the latter half of the 1860s the National Debt Office 
                                                 
23 S. Brisman “Den stora reformperioden 1860-1904” in Sveriges Riksbank 1668-1924-1931. Bankens tillkomst 
och verksamhet, part IV. (Stockholm 1931); thereafter: Brisman “Den stora reformperioden” and A. Ögren 
Empirical Studies in Money, Credit and Banking: The Swedish Credit Market in Transition under the Silver and 
Gold Standards, 1834 – 1913. (Stockholm 2003); thereafter: Ögren Empirical Studies and Ögren “Free or 
Central Banking” 
24 It has been written that the Office did not cooperate with any Swedish commercial banks, but in the 1860s the 
Office was criticised for its extremely close ties to one of the major commercial banks, the Skandiaviska Kredit 
AB, in which’s board several of the Office’s board members also were represented. This bank was involved in 
the 1861 loan according to the loan contracts of the National Debt Office.      16
solved these problems with increased cooperation with the Riksbank and involving more 
domestic banks. Not only did the Office accumulate knowledge about debt management, new 
forms of loans were developed to better suit the needs of the State. 
25   
As was the case with other countries experiencing a financial revolution, Sweden became a 
large net importer of capital. The costs of these loans diminished over time, and new loans 
could be raised to pay for older more expensive loans already in the early 1870s. Foreign 
loans were however always denominated in the lenders currency. 
The loans taken by the National Debt Office were different forms of bond loans, mainly 
aimed for international markets. The Office’s bonds were circulating as securities also on the 
domestic market. One of the investors in National Debt Office bonds was the Riksbank, who 
held these bonds as assets that could be turned into reserves when necessary.
26 The banking 
system also held these bonds as assets in a manner that increasingly came to replace cash 
reserves. 
The market for domestic securities, most notably bonds, became noteworthy in size in the 
early 1870s. In 1861 the Mortgage Bank of Sweden was established to coordinate the business 
of the Mortgage companies. The first domestic life insurance company was established in 
1855 and the commercial banking system within its legal boundaries started to grow in the 
1850s. As repressions on bank establishments were revoked in 1864 these banks could 
become fully fledged commercial banks. The result of this financial revolution was clearly 
visible in the rapid increase in financial services that took place in the early 1870s.
27 
The Banking system and the Swedish monetization 
The commercial banks functioned in a complementary manner by themselves. The banks 
turned fixed and indivisible assets into liquid liabilities. These liquid liabilities could consist 
of demand deposits, or as in the case of Sweden, private bank notes. Thus the commercial 
banking system was important for the financial revolution as it managed to create financial 
instruments also to be used as means of payments. The Enskilda bank notes were regarded as 
safer more trustworthy than what had been used for payments prior (for instance personal 
                                                 
25 K. Hildebrand Riksgäldskontoret 1798 – 1934 (Stockholm 1934); thereafter: Hildebrand Riksgäldskontoret 
26 Ögren: “Lender of Last Resort” and A. Ögren “Sweden’s Monetary Internationalization under the Silver and 
Gold Standards, 1834 – 1913” Unpublished Working Paper (EconomiX/Université de Paris X – Nanterre 2008); 
thereafter: Ögren “Sweden’s Monetary Internationalization” 
27 Ögren “The Rationale of Private Note Issuance” and L. Schön “Kapitalimport, kreditmarknad och 
indutrialisering 1850-1910” in E. Dahmén (Ed.) Upplåning och utveckling. Riksgäldskontoret 1789-1989. 
(Stockholm 1989); thereafter: Schön ”Kapitalimport”   17
IOUs and authorized assignments).
28 In an economy suffering from a lack of trustworthy 
means of payments, the Enskilda bank note issuance thus became an important part of the 
formal monetization. This monetization was also an important part in the creation of liquid 
secondary asset (or security) markets. 
The necessity to complement the business of the Parliamentary Riksbank by allowing for 
the establishment of private commercial banks was agreed upon in Parliament, thus an official 
Royal Proclamation in 1824 guaranteed this right, and as all other businesses banks were to be 
run under the principle of unlimited liability. The Crown had to agree upon each banks’ 
regulations to grant a time limited (ten year) charter. The importance of the need for an anchor 
currency for banking business was apparent since it was the decision to reestablish the silver 
standard in 1830 that led to the establishment of the first commercial bank in Sweden, Skåne 
Enskilda Bank. The Parliament agreed to the note issuing rights of the Enskilda banks, since 
this was considered as the only way of making it possible to fund banking business in a 
country suffering from lack of means of payments.
29 
Until the middle of the 1860s, bank establishment was more or less a monopoly affair for 
those who managed to be granted charters to run banking business. Strong groups in 
Parliament, and allies to the Crown, had business interests in keeping competition as low as 
possible. As a result, banking establishment was prevented until political representation 
changed. 
In 1851 the increasing hostility towards the local Enskilda bank monopolies led to an 
attempt with none note issuing banks relying on Riksbank credit; the so called Filial banks. 
The attempt with the Filial banks showed how under-established the banking sector was. 
Initially funds that were meant to support the establishment of three Filial banks had to 
support eight such banks. Within a few years nineteen Filial banks were established, 
competing for funds that were only a fraction of what the twelve existing Enskilda banks 
issued in notes. In addition, the Crown who regulated the charters prevented the Filial banks 
from the possibility to accept deposits. 
                                                 
28 T. Engdahl & A. Ögren “Multiple paper monies in Sweden, 1789-1903: Substitution or complementarity?” 
Financial History Review, 15:1; thereafter: Engdahl & Ögren “Multiple paper monies” The so called Authorized 
Assignment was a form of non interest bearing check that was drawn on the issuer’s credit (or deposits) in the 
Riksbank. In accordance with the law, these checks could be issued by the holder of the credit taking the time of 
circulation into account. In practice this meant that there was no limit to the issuance of checks as long as the 
issuer was not declared as bankrupt. If this happened the holders of the checks would be the ones to carry the 
costs. This occurred en masse during the crises of 1848 and the Authorized Assignments lost popular trust. S. 
Brisman  Sveriges Affärsbanker. Grundläggningstiden. (Stockholm 1924) pp. 9-11, 18; therafter: Brisman 
Sveriges Affärsbanker   18
By the early 1860s the opposing parts in Parliament agreed to end the attempt with Filial 
banks, at the condition of freer establishment of commercial banks. From 1865 existing Filial 
banks either merged with existing Enskilda banks or reformed as new Enskilda banks. In 
addition a number of new Enskilda banks were opened, increasing the number of commercial 
banks from nineteen to twenty five and the number of note issuing Enskilda banks rose from 
twelve. The number of bank offices increased as well from fifty in 1860 to hundred and five 
in 1866, and then actually reached a level of between four and five offices per bank, a level 
that was kept until after 1900. This rapid bank establishment coincided with the abolishment 
of the usury law and the possibility to establish none-note issuing limited liability banks.
30  
Table 2: No of Commercial banks & offices, Money Supply, Bank assets and Bank lending in 























1840  6  n.a.  14.1  15.9 2.8 5.4  n.a.  n.a. 
1850  8  n.a  12.2  16.2 4.2 9.3  n.a.  n.a. 
1860 12 50  12.1  21.5  8.7  16.5  n.a.  n.a. 
1870 30  136  9.9  35.4  20.2  36.5  n.a.  n.a. 
1880  44  205 12.6  76.4 43.8 77.3  19.6  25.6 
1890  43  190 15.4  120.6 74.2  109.2  40.4  50.3 
1900  67  269  20.7  200.3  149.9  201.3 56.1 70.2 
1910 80  625  25.9  312.6  258.7  316.8  91.3  110.2 
Sources: Brisman, S. (1924), Nygren, I. Post & Inrikes tidning 1835 – 1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas 
Uppgifter 1871 – 1911, SCB (1955), Sveriges Riksbank (1931) 
As seen in figure 5 above, the freer bank establishment from the middle of the 1860s 
immediately led to a notable increase in financial services provided by the commercial banks. 
Bank assets, lending and the broad money supply all more than doubled, showing the 
importance of developing a nation wide financial system.  
The notes issued by the Enskilda banks were based on the fixed exchange rate maintained 
by the Riksbank from 1834. Although the Riksbank accepted Enskilda bank notes from banks 
with an exchange agent or an office in Stockholm from 1869, only notes issued by the 
Riksbank were kept as reserves by the banking system. 
Initially the Enskilda banks funded their business by the issuance of notes without paying 
much attention to deposits. With the reintroduction of the ‘postal bank bill’ in 1855, deposits 
became nearly as liquid as notes. Although notes initially might seem as a cheaper source of 
                                                                                                                                                         
29 K. Kock Skånska Privatbanken. Minnesskrift. (Stockholm 1931); thereafter: Skånska Privatbanken and Ögren 
Empirical Studies    19
funds, the discount costs the Enskilda banks faced for exchanging these notes and increased 
taxes on note issuance made deposits an equally profitable alternative. Deposits also had other 
advantages, as the amount of notes a bank could issue was regulated by law which was not the 
case for deposits. The question of note issuance by the Enskilda banks was regularly 
monitored and debated in terms of banking business prudence, and consequently even though 
deposits might have been somewhat more expensive for the banks than note issuance, 
deposits had its advantages.
 31 
The broad money supply stayed fairly stable between 1855 and 1868 but notes in 
circulation decreased. During this period the Enskilda banks altered their liabilities by 
substituting deposits for notes. In the late 1860s, from the through year of 1868, both note 
issuance as well as deposits started to grow again, and from the year 1867, deposits was the 
main component of the broad money supply. As seen in figure 5 the broad money supply 
increased enormously during a few years in the late 1860s and early 1870s suggesting a 
breakthrough in monetization between the years 1868 until 1872.  
The shift in money supply was accompanied by a shift in the lending pattern of the 
commercial banks. Discharging the early years with extreme growth, growth in commercial 
bank lending for the rest of the period was at an annual rate off seven percent. The more 
liquidized the economy became, the less cash reserves banks had to hold and the more lending 
banks could engage in.  
Already from the 1820s, savings among the public was encouraged through the 
establishment of Savings Banks. In a beginning Savings Bank offices were small, isolated and 
scattered allover the country. As part of the complementarities of the financial system, the 
importance of the Savings Banks on the credit market increased with the establishment of 
commercial banks. Although these organizations were meant to be philanthropic institutions 
supporting the virtue of saving, this meant an increased opportunity for these banks to channel 
their funds to the loan market through the commercial banks. A common situation was that 
                                                                                                                                                         
30 Ögren Empirical Studies  and Ögren “The Rationale of Private Note Issuance” 
31 Ögren ”Free or Central Banking” and Ögren “The Rationale of Private Note Issuance”   20
the same persons that sat in the Board of the local Savings Bank also sat in the Board of the 
local commercial bank, and/or that Savings Banks and Commercial Banks shared office.
32  
Did the financial system promote economic growth? 
Figure 5 below show that a general increase in formal financial services and economic growth 
took place in the early 1870s. If the financial system, including monetization, was important 
for the economy, this should be traceable as a link between measures of the financial sector 
and economic growth.  
Figure 5: Per capita Economic growth (GDP), Industry growth, Money Supply (M2) and 

































































































Source: Krantz, O. (2001), Myrdal, G. & Bouvin, S. (1933), Ögren, A. (2003) 
To study the financial system as a whole I have divided the financial variables into two 
groups: Financial Basis Variables and Monetary variables. Financial Basis Variables are: 
                                                 
32H. Hellgren Fasta förbindelser: en studie av låntagare hos sparbanken och informella kreditgivare i Sala 1860 
– 1910 (Uppsala 2003); thereafter, Hellgren Fasta förbindelser and T. Petersson Framväxten av ett lokalt 
banksystem: Oppunda sparbank, Södermanlands enskilda bank och stationssamhället Katrineholm 1850 – 1916 
(Uppsala 2001); thereafter: Petersson Framväxten. The Savings Banks were successful in competing for funds 
from the public and as the use of deposits grew in importance, the groups in Parliament that had an interest in 
working for credit market liberalization in the case of the Commercial Banks worked for large restrictions on the 
Saving Banks’ possibility to run banking business. The result of this became a new Savings Bank law in the 
middle of the 1890s that forced the Savings Banks to end their loan business and return to the “old values” of 
philanthropically fostering the public in the virtue of saving. As a consequence a large number of Savings Banks 
reformed into small local joint stock banks, so called Folk Banks (Folkbanker) A. Sjölander “Att reglera eller   21
Commercial Bank Assets (ASSETS), Equity Capital in commercial Banks (EQCAP), 
Commercial Bank Lending (LEND). The idea is that especially the measure of assets 
(ASSETS) and to some extent the equity capital (EQCAP) shall capture the growth and 
consolidation of the financial system. Such a growth should not be possible in the long run 
without sustained productivity growth. Lending (LEND) as a variable lies somewhere in 
between as a channel of wealth in the banking system to economic productivity. 
Monetary Variables are: Monetary Base (MBASE), Liquidity (LIQ) and Broad Money 
Supply (M1 and M2). The monetary base (MBASE) is the provision of possible cash reserves 
to be held by the banking system. It can either be held as liquidity by the public or lie as 
reserves in the banking system thus serving to increase credit and the money supply through 
the money multiplier mechanism. Thus if access to credit and means of payments are of 
importance for economic growth the variable monetary base (MBASE) is expected to 
positively affect economic growth. 
Formal liquidity (LIQ) is means of payments trusted by all parts and directly possible to 
use for all transactions. It is the main instrument in order to avoid transaction costs. This is of 
especial importance in an illiquid emerging economy in the process of formalizing and 
integrating its domestic markets. The Swedish system, combining the Riksbank, an issuer of 
base money and with the ultimate responsibility for preserving international specie 
convertibility, with the private Enskilda banks as domestic note issuers, allowed a greater 
expansion of means of payments than otherwise would have been the case. The choice of the 
Enskilda banks—supported by the public—to rely more on Riksbank notes than on specie for 
their reserves led to a greater expansion of liquidity than what otherwise would have been 
possible.
33 The larger acknowledgement of the means of payments, the more it can be used in 
larger networks, including as became the case with the Enskilda bank notes, the entire 
Country (and some neighboring regions in Norway and Denmark). As transaction costs and 
risks decreases and investments becomes more liquid, more pay offs are available for 
economic activity. Thus it is a likely hypothesis that the increase in formal liquidity (LIQ) 
supplied by the Enskilda banks on top of the Riksbank notes was related to economic growth 
and modernization. 
Broad Money Supply is measured as liquidity (LIQ) plus the public’s deposits in 
commercial banks (M1). M2 also includes the public’s deposits in savings banks. The broad 
                                                                                                                                                         
inte reglera – En undersökning av Sparbanksfrågan i Riksdagen 1882 – 1939” Uppsala Papers in Financial 
History 13 (2000); thereafter: Sjölander “Att reglera” 
33 Ögren “Free or Central Banking”   22
money supply does not only capture monetization but also the growth of public wealth in the 
banking system. The measure M1 is in some studies used as a proxy for financial deepening 
or financial development as a whole. But as the savings banks were important actors on the 
financial market the measure M2 might be more appropriate. It is seen in figures 4 how 
closely related M1 is to commercial bank lending (LEND) and M2 to their assets (ASSETS). 
There are two measures of economic growth: Total Economic Growth (GDP) and Modern 
Sector Growth (MODSEC). The latter is defined as growth in industry and handicrafts and 
became the largest single sector of productivity just before the end of the century when it 
surpassed the agricultural sector. This is in line with the hypothesis of creative destruction, 
that the financial revolution sustains investments in newer more risky technologies. 
Since the series are not stationary, that is that they are growing over time, I begin the 
econometric testing with cointegration tests (see Appendix). The first question is how the 
different financial and monetary variables were related to each other. Looking at the series of 
these variables (figure 4) indicates that some of the variables indeed seemed grow in a manner 
which was closely related to each other. Among the financial basis variable the commercial 
banks assets and lending took off in the late 1860s, and the same was the case for the broad 
money supplies (M1 andM2). The importance of the financial and monetary variables for 
economic growth and modernization is however more difficult to see. 
There are three important results of the cointegration tests: 1) First and most important, the 
growth of the financial and monetary variables were clearly related to economic growth and 
modernization (see table 4 in the Appendix). 2) Also, the growth of the financial and the 
monetary variables were interlinked (see table 3 in Appendix) supporting the importance of 
the development of the financial and monetary system as a whole. 3) There was a distinct 
difference between the pre- and the post- financial revolution period (see tables 3 and 4 in the 
Appendix) strengthening the impact of the financial revolution for the growth of the financial 
system and its impact on real economic growth and modernization. 
 Granger causality tests further strengthens the importance of the financial and monetary 
development for economic growth and modernization in the case of Sweden (see Appendix 
and Table 5). There was a positive causality running from changes in the financial and 
monetary variables to changes in general economic growth and growth in the particular 
industrial sector. The significant results (at the 5-percent level) of the Granger causality tests 
are summarized in figure 6 below.   23
Figure 6: A Stylized Illustration of the Significant Granger Causalities in Table 5 above.    
 
At 5 % significance level 
First and most importantly the results of the granger causality analysis supports that growth 
was finance-led in the case of Sweden. Changes in the monetary variables granger caused 
changes in GDP as well as in the modern sector (MODSEC). This result concerning liquidity 
(LIQ) underlines the importance of creating means of payments with the qualities that makes 
them accepted for transactions outside small regional networks. The specie standard kept the 
value of the means of payments, and the Enskilda banks supplied liquidity to an extent that 
facilitated economic growth. The monetary base (MBASE) and the broad money supply (M2) 
also granger caused growth in the modern sector as well as in total GDP.  
The financial basis in terms of commercial bank assets (ASSETS) and equity capital 
(EQCAP) affected overall economic growth (GDP). Lending, however, did not affect GDP 
but had a mutual relationship with growth in the modern sector (MODSEC). The only 
somewhat puzzling result is that growth in the modern sector granger caused changes in 
commercial bank assets. All in all the results clearly support the importance of the financial 
system for growth as well as modernization in the economy.  
The financial variables also seemed to affect different sides of the growing economy. All 
the monetary variables affected growth in the modern sector as well as in overall GDP, 
whereas the financial basis variables seemed to be related exclusively to growth in overall 








EQCAP   24
the fact that growth in the modern sector fostered growth in overall GDP, and not conversely. 
This result highlights the importance of creative destruction for long term economic growth. 
But there is more to the picture of the financial revolution than the fact that economic 
growth and modernization followed on the growth of the banking system, and the money 
supply. Financial and monetary variables were interlinked in the developing process into a 
system. The financial basis promoted the most liquid forms of the monetary variables. The 
monetary variables all supported lending, which in turn positively affected growth in the 
banking system (represented by commercial bank assets). All this supports the idea of the 
importance of the development of financial sector as a system where different parts 
complement each other. Not least the importance of a financial system for a successful 
monetization.
34 
That among the monetary variables liquidity granger caused growth in the broad money 
supply is expected. The broad money supply on the other hand caused changes in the 
monetary base. This result is in line with the monetary approach to the balance of payments, 
i.e. that increased demand for money eventually forces the monetary authority to adjust the 
monetary base.
35 Among the financial basis variables lending served to build up the assets of 
the banking system. There was a mutual relationship between equity capital and lending.  
Conclusions 
As was the case in other historical experiences, the Swedish financial revolution was built on 
complementary between different parts of the financial sector. The synergy effects created the 
financial revolution and made it important for economic growth. Fundamental financial and 
institutional changes were made from the middle of the 1850s to the early 1870s.  
A stable currency was put into existence in 1834, managed by the Riksbank that prioritized 
the specie convertibility before all other objectives. Thus the market share of the Riksbank 
decreased as its role was transformed to more of that of a central bank. 
The National Debt Office managed the State’s debt and managed from the late 1850s to 
import capital from international capital markets. The Office became better at both organizing 
its business and creating high quality financial instruments, bonds, to raise capital. 
Throughout the nineteenth century bonds were the main security traded. In 1861 the then 
                                                 
34 See Ögren “Sweden’s Monetary Internationalization” for a deeper study of this issue.  
35 See L. Jonung "Swedish Experience under the Classical Gold Standard 1873-1913", in M.D. Bordo and A. 
Schwartz (red.), The Classical Gold Standard in Retrospective. University of Chicago Press/National Bureau of 
Economic Research 1984; thereafter: Jonung “Swedish Experience” and Ögren “Sweden’s Monetary 
Internationalization”   25
existing Mortgage Associations, which funded their lending also by bond issuance, jointly 
established the Swedish Mortgage Bank.  
Changes in political representation made a nation wide establishment of commercial banks 
possible. This took place in the middle of the 1860s and was based on the tasks of the 
Riksbank and the National Debt Office as well as the growing security market. The banks that 
were established, unlimited liability commercial banks, served the purpose of raising funds 
for their business by issuing notes. Besides being able to invest in local business ventures, 
these banks managed the monetization by liquidizing fixed assets. This led to the liquidity 
spiral where banks were able to substitute interest bearing securities for cash reserves, thereby 
feeding monetization further. In such manner the banks could consolidate more thus lending 
more. 
The financial revolution in Sweden made its mark in the growing financial services and 
monetization from the late 1860s. Growth in the real economy measured as per capita GDP in 
stable prices, and growth in the industrial sector of the economy accelerated later in the 
nineteenth century. Cointegration tests showed that financial variables and economic growth 
were growing in harmony. It also showed that there existed different periods, one pre- and one 
post financial revolution period. 
The financial revolution preceded the structural transformation that made the industry the 
leading sector in the economy. Monetization and public wealth in the banking system granger 
caused changes in the modern (industrial) sector as well as in overall GDP. This demonstrated 
the role the monetization and the financial system played for the process of creative 
destruction to take place. Measures of the financial system affected growth in overall GDP. 
The development of the financial system and monetization were also dependent on each other, 
showing the importance of the financial revolution occurring as the growth of a system.  
Appendix 
We should note the fact that some variables are long term stock variables such as commercial 
bank assets and equity capital, whereas others are more short term flow variables such as 
liquidity and the monetary base. The measures of economic growth are both more of flow 
variables but as most “flow” variables in time series they are very dependent on their size in 
prior periods. Variables such as commercial bank lending and the broad money supply are 
also possible to regard as flow as well as stock variables. Thus it is difficult to make a clear 
distinction between these variables in this respect.   26
Cointegration 
Since all the series are non-stationary I begin with testing if they are cointegrated. 
Cointegration test is used to discover stable relationship between data series if there are trends 
in these series. The time series are cointegrated if there exists one (or several) linear 
combination(-s) between the two non- stationary variables that is stationary. Such a linear 
combination shows an econometric equilibrium relationship between the variables; that is that 
the variables do not move randomly in relation to each other over time. 
The cointegration test shows that there existed relationship between the financial basis and 
monetary variables (table 3). In the case of the financial basis variables commercial bank 
assets and equity capital shared two common vectors. That there existed two vectors is a 
result of the break between the post and the pre financial revolution. In the early period 
commercial bank assets and equity capital was almost at the same level indicating one stable 
relationship. The difference in growth between commercial bank assets and equity capital 
after the late 1860 shows another relationship. Assets and lending appears to have been close 
all over the period with one single vector on short term as well. 
As liquidity and broad money supply (M1 and M2) were parts of each other it is not 
surprising that there were cointegration relationships, but the results underline the importance 
of the financial revolution with two cointegration vectors; one for the series pre the financial 
revolution and one post. We can also see that there was only one vector for the relationship 
between the monetary base and the other monetary variables. There was no cointegration 
vector for the early period but one for the post financial revolution period which shows that 
the monetary base was more important for the money supply after the financial revolution. 
Table 3: Cointegration vectors and their significance for pair wise cointegration tests 
between financial basis variables (assets (ASSETS), equity capital (EQCAP) and lending 
(LEND) of commercial banks) and monetary variables (Monetary Base (MBASE), Liquidity 
(LIQ) and Broad Money Supply (M1 and M2)), 1834 – 1913 Per capita and in Constant 




























1    1** 1** 1**,1**  1**,1*  1**,1*  1  1*,1*  1*   
2      1*      1*,1* 2     
3         1*  3       
4  1*          4       






















LEND M1  LEND M2 
1  1* 1*,1*  1**  1**,1**  1* 1*  1*,1**  1**,1**  1**,1** 
2     1**,1**       1*  1* 
3     1**,1*       1*   
4        1 *        
5        1 *        
* 5% and ** 1% significance level 
Putting the financial basis variables together with the monetary variables shows that there 
evidently was a strong relationship between the broad money supply and commercial bank 
assets and lending. Also we see that there are two cointegration vectors, indicating two 
different stable relationships between the series over time. Equity capital and the monetary 
fundaments, i.e. the monetary base and liquidity, were not related. 
The two measures of economic growth, overall GDP and the modern sector (MODSEC) 
represented by industry and handicrafts were sharing one cointegrating vector, i.e. were 
related. As the modern sector was one of several sectors included in the GDP this is not 
surprising.  
As seen in table 4 below there were significant relationships between the growth of the 
financial and monetary system and the economy. All three financial basis variables were 
related to the two measures of growth, GDP and the modern sector. Exclusively this was the 
case with two cointegrating vectors, which means that the development of the financial 
system was related to economic growth both before and after the financial revolution.  
Table 4: Cointegration vectors and their significance for pair wise cointegration tests 
between financial basis variables (assets (ASSETS), equity capital (EQCAP) and lending 
(LEND) of commercial banks), monetary variables (Monetary Base (MBASE), Liquidity (LIQ) 
and Broad Money Supply (M1 and M2)) and growth variables (GDP and modern sector 
(MODSEC), 1834 – 1913 Per capita and in Constant Prices (1834=1). 1000’s SEK. 
Financial Basis and Growth 









LEND GDP  LEND 
MODSEC 
1 1**,1*  1**,1**  1*,1*  1*,1**  1*,1*  1**,1** 
2     1**,1**  1*  1*,1*  1*,1*  1**,1** 
3 1*,1*  1**,1**  1*,1*  1*,1*  1*,1,*  1**,1** 
4 1**,1*  1**,1**  1*  1*,1*  1**,1*  1**,1** 
5     1**,1*        1*,1*  1**,1* 
Monetary and Growth Variables 
No of Lags 
M1 GDP  M1 
MODSEC 
M2 GDP  M2 MODSEC  MBASE 
GDP 
LIQ 
MODSEC   28
1 1**,1*  1**,1**  1**,1*  1**,1**  1*     
2 1*,1*  1**,1**  1*  1**,1*      1**,1* 
3 1*,1*  1**,1**  1*,1*  1**,1**      1*,1* 
4 1*,1**  1**,1**  1*,1*  1*,1**         
5     1*,1*           1**,1* 
* 5% and ** 1% significance level 
Economic growth was also related to the monetary variables. The same pattern emerges for 
the broad money supply as for commercial bank assets and lending. Liquidity and the 
monetary base as monetary fundaments were also related to economic growth but not in the 
same strong manner. As these provided a basis for the overall expansion of the financial and 
the monetary system this is not surprising. It is more surprising that liquidity was related to 
growth in the modern sector before as well as after the financial revolution.  
There was apparently a connection in the growth of the financial and monetary system and 
the economy, not least in the emerging industrial sector. The cointegration analysis is 
followed up with a Granger causality test to sort out the issue of eventual causality. 
Granger causality 
The Granger causality is actually a test of order of occurrence, this means that it tests if 
variable A changed before or after variable B or vice versa. Since the data series are non-
stationary I have differenced them to overcome this problem for the significance test. This 
means that we look exclusively at changes, i.e. if a change in variable A is preceding a change 
in variable B the next period. The result of the Granger causality test is listed in table 5 below. 
Table 5: Significant Granger Causalities between Total Assets in the Commercial Banking 
system (ASSETS), Equity Capital (EQCAP), the Monetary Base (MBASE), the Liquid Money 
Supply (LIQ), the Broad Money Supply (M1 and M2), Economic Growth (GDP) and Growth 
in the Modern Sector (MODSEC), 1834 – 1913. All variables in constant prices and per 
capita (five lags).    
Monetary Variables  Financial Basis Variables  Growth Variables 
D(LIQ) → D(M2)*  D(LEND) → D(ASSETS)**  D(MODSEC) → D(GDP)** 
D(M2) → D(MBASE)**  D(EQCAP)* ↔ D(LEND)**    
Monetary & Financial Basis 
Variables  Monetary & Growth Variables 
Financial Basis & Growth 
Variables 
D(MBASE)** ↔ (ASSETS)**   D(LIQ) → D(MODSEC)**  D(MODSEC) → D(ASSETS)** 
D(ASSETS) → D(LIQ)**  D(M2) → D(MODSEC)**  D(ASSETS) → D(GDP)*  
D(MBASE)**↔ D(LEND)**  D(M2) → D(GDP)**  D(EQCAP) → D(GDP)** 
D(LIQ) → D(LEND)*  D(MBASE) → D(MODSEC)**  D(LEND)** ↔ D(MODSEC)* 
D(M2) → D(LEND)**     
** 1%, * 5%, significance level 
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